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ABSTRAK 
Krisis moneter 1997–1998 merupakan titik tolak perubahan mendasar dari struktur 
kepemilikan bank di Indonesia. Divestasi perbankan yang dilakukan pascarestrukturisasi 
perbankan telah mengubah peta struktur perbankan di Indonesia. Mayoritas kepemilikan 
bank-bank di Indonesia kini dikuasai oleh pihak asing. Sementara itu, mengingat 
majoritas kepemilikan saham perbankan dimiliki asing, sebagian besar bank tersebut 
cenderung mengganti direktur utama (chief executive officer) dengan bankir asing. 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat pengaruh struktur kepemilikan dengan performa 
bank, berdasarkan pendekatan profitabilitas dan penilaian pasar (accounting-based 
measures and market-based measures).  
Dengan menggunakan data panel untuk 12 bank listed di Indonesia selama 2004–2007 
dan metode generalized least square fixed effect model, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa 
terdapat hubungan yang signifikan antara struktur kepemilikan dan latar belakang CEO 
dengan performa bank.  
Kata kunci: Restrukturisasi perbankan, struktur kepemilikan, dan performa bank 
 
INTRODUCTION1 
Banking institutions have played a major 
role in Indonesian economy for decades. 
History showed that even Indonesian economy 
is thriving in a row with the banking 
development. Instead of being an intermediary 
financial institution, banking has been holding 
the national transaction payment and 
functioning as a monetary policy transmitter. 
Therefore, when the country was hit by an 
enormous economic crisis, the first step taken 
by the government and the central bank was 
restructuring the banking sector to restore the 
national banking system.  
The currency turmoil and economic shock 
in mid 1997 has forced the government and 
                                                          
1  Artikel ini adalah artikel peraih penghargaan sebagai 
artikel harapan ketiga pada ajang Best Paper Award 
JEBI 2008. 
the central bank to liquidate 16 banks, which 
affected the society trustiness to banking 
sector. The decision to liquidate several banks 
finally got response; many banks could not 
survive in a heavy bank rush. Seen how 
insufficient the bank’s capitalization, the 
government and the central bank focused on 
recapping banks and tooking over the capital 
insufficient banks through Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA).  
Afterwards, in 2002, IBRA decided to 
divesture a number of shares in several banks 
and Bank Central Asia (BCA) went to be the 
first bank being divestured. After BCA 
divestment, IBRA continued the divestment 
process to many recaps banks. The majorities 
of all investors interested in buying those 
banks are foreign investors. The decision 
made a significant change in Indonesian 
banking structure, especially in ownership 
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structure. Several largest players in the 
market, such as Bank Central Asia, Bank 
Danamon Indonesia, Bank Lippo, Bank Niaga, 
and Bank International Indonesia, has been 
taken by foreign investors. Not only the bank 
ownership that has been changed, but also 
many banks prefer to change the director or 
the chief executive officer (CEO) of the banks. 
Actually, do ownership structure and the CEO 
background affect banking performance? Do 
foreign-owned banks perform better than 
domestic one, or vise versa?  
This paper intends to contribute to a better 
understanding of the effects of ownership on 
bank performance by looking closely at the 
experience of one country, Indonesia. Recent 
papers have studied on the role of ownership 
structure to bank performance on large cross-
countries. In fact, it is important to focus on 
individual country experiences so that it would 
not be easy to disentangle the effects of 
ownership structure on bank performance 
from those of other concurrent financial 
reforms (Majnoni, et. al., 2003). As a transito-
ry economy country, it is important to 
examine whether foreign ownership affects 
banking performance in Indonesia or not, or 
maybe the domestic ownership performs 
better. Meanwhile, two years on average after 
the banking divestment possibly the best time 
to see the relationship between ownership 
structure to bank performance in Indonesia.  
The first part of this paper (section 2 and 
3) provides an overview of the Indonesian 
banking sector pre and post economic crisis, 
1998–1999. Specifically, this paper discusses 
the economic and banking condition before 
crisis, the banking crisis, the bank restruc-
turing and the role of foreign banks after the 
programs. The second part (section 4) 
explained the relationship between ownership 
structure and bank performance in several 
countries and regions.  
The third part (section 5 and 6) verifies 
the actual condition based on a statistical 
significance and can withstand econometric 
test. Over the sample of 12 listed banks in 
2004–2007, this paper examines whether 
foreign ownership has significantly affected 
bank performance. In addition, this paper also 
tests whether foreign CEO has significantly 
affected bank performance either. The last part 
is the conclusion and policy implication.  
THE INDONESIAN BANKING DEVE-
LOPMENT AND POST CRISIS RE-
STRUCTURING 
Banking Sector on Preeconomic Crisis 
Until the first half of 1997, Indonesian 
economy has been in a rapid development. 
Since the 1970s, Indonesia had a consistently 
high economic growth, with gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth at average 7–8 percent 
per annum. Inflation was contained consis-
tently at a single digit level. The dynamic 
private sector was supported by a high savings 
rate and domestic investment, and it almost 
reached 30 percent of GDP in 1996 (Halim, 
2000). At the same time, a large amount of 
capital was in flown from foreign investors. 
Moreover, Indonesia became one of the 
emerging countries, the ‘Asian Tigers’, for its 
sustained economic growth and strong 
economic fundamentals. Nevertheless, until 
the currency turmoil in July 1997, Indonesia’s 
economy turned to be ultimately devastated.  
For decades, banking sector has been a 
prominent element in the financial sector. It 
constituted a large portion of total assets in 
financial sector. Although other non-bank 
financial institutions, such as multi-financing, 
securities, insurance, and investment funds, 
had emerged, the banking sector still held 
about 65 percent of all financial sector total 
assets in 1997 (Halim, 2000). Thus, the 
condition of the banking sector generally 
reflects the financial sector as a whole.  
Unfortunately, the weakness in Indonesian 
banking sector fundamentals at the end 
became resilience to the economy. It was 
exposed by an unsound financial and ill-
regulated banking sector saddled with 
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extremely high non-performing loans in the 
property sector. So that, when external shock 
from a regional financial panic happened to hit 
Indonesian currency market, it could not 
preserve the economy. Then as the contagious 
process developed, the shock spread to 
become a financial crisis, and soon after the 
economic crisis.  
The income of the banking system 
declined significantly by 300 percent in 1997, 
while that of the property sector fell by 660 
percent. Banks became incapable of 
performing their financial intermediary 
functions. The rupiah depreciation caused 
investors, who had borrowed in US dollars 
(accounting for about 30 per cent of bank 
loans9), to default as their collateral was very 
much below the value of their loans. High 
interest rates also encouraged defaults, eroding 
the bank’s assets. 
The Collapse of Banking Sector and 
Financial Crisis 
The currency turmoil in mid-August 1997 
and subsequent policies have turned the 
economy around. Before floating the currency, 
the central bank tried to hold the moving band 
system from speculative attack by widening 
the band from 8 to 12 percent and selling 
dollars in both spot and swap markets. Bank 
Indonesia Certificate (SBI) rated several times 
from 12 to 30 percent in December 1997, and 
even reached 80 percent in August 1998.  
At first, the government expected high 
interest rates to stem the capital flight and 
prevent further depreciation, but then they 
turned out to be ineffective. After the float, the 
government pursued a tight money policy by 
absorbing more than Rp10 trillion (US$3.8 
billion) of public sector funds from commer-
cial banks to discourage people from buying 
dollars with rupiahs. But, this policy measure 
proved ineffective and the rupiah continued to 
weaken against the US dollar. 
The banking crisis was preceded by a 
short period of distress when, due to a process 
of erosion of confidence, banks lost their 
deposit bases. In addition, the inter-bank 
money market functioned poorly, in that it 
suffered from compartmentalization. Weak 
banks had to system. Individually, a bank 
confronted with a problem of mismatched 
liquidity could easily rely on Bank Indonesia 
to keep afloat. Confidence was completely 
lost, and a substantial number of banks were 
confronted with bank-runs within a short 
period. Strangely, in the recent Indonesian 
experience, these phenomena happened 
following the closure of the 16 banks in early 
November 1997, which was originally 
designed to boost confidence in the banking 
become insolvent. For the banking sector, the 
problem changed from distress to crisis 
(Djiwandono, 1998). 
Bank Restructuring  
The main objectives of the restructuring 
non-viable bank program were to overhaul the 
banking system and to enable banks to 
function as financial intermediation as effi-
ciently and quickly as possible. The 
sequencing of resolving financial crises 
usually comprises of three main steps: (i) a 
diagnostic review; (ii) a resolution of non-
viable institutions and recapitalization of 
viable ones; and (iii) a resolution of non-
performing loans. Essentially, bank restruc-
turing consists of two elements, including 
financial restructuring including capital injec-
tion and loan restructuring and operational 
restructuring comprising of improvement of a 
bank’s internal organization such as its 
operational efficiency, governance, risk 
management and control (Batunanggar, 2002). 
When the currency crisis spread to inflict 
the national economy, the government's 
efforts to address the banking problems were 
combined with other policies and treated as 
part of the adjustment policies for stability and 
sustainable growth. This treatment was more 
explicit in the IMF supported programs, from 
the first Letter of Intent in November 1997 to 
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the most recent (the fourth) in June 1998. 
Basically, the IMF supported program was 
comprised of a comprehensive policy package 
to deal with insolvent and weak banks, and to 
overcome structural rigidities in the economy, 
supported by prudent fiscal and monetary 
policy (Djiwandono, 1998).  
Under pressure from the IMF, non-viable 
banks were closed, others were recapitalized. 
Bank restructuring included changes to bank 
management and ownership, as well as the 
settlement of outstanding loans. The govern-
ment launched a series of reforms in the 
banking sector, including the closure of ailing 
banks, took-over of troubled but viable banks, 
and the recapitalization of relatively healthy 
banks. In November 1997, the licenses of 
insolvent 16 banks were revoked and the 
banks were liquidated. Financial panic ensued, 
interest rates shot up, and more banks were 
frozen and taken-over in 1998. Since then, the 
country’s ailing banking sector has been 
suffering negative spreads, which occurs when 
the interest on deposits (expenses) was higher 
than interest on credits (income).  
Specifically, there are several steps taken 
by the government in order to resound the 
banking sector. In 1998, nine troubled banks 
were taken over by IBRA, in addition to the 
seven banks already under IBRA manage-
ment. Some other 54 weak banks were put 
under its close supervision. Minimum capital 
requirements were reduced from Rp1 trillion 
to Rp250 billion (after loan loss provisions). 
Sweeping reforms of the banking system in 
March 1999 resulted in the closure of 38 banks 
and the took-over of 7 banks, leaving 73 banks 
that were considered healthy (Halim, 2000).  
Postbanking Crisis and The Divestment 
Program   
Table 1 provides an overview of structural 
changes in the banking sector around the time 
of the crisis. The total number of commercial 
banks declined by 37 percent from 239 at the 
end of 1996 to 151 at the end of 2000, as the 
closure of banks ran its course. While the size 
of assets in the banking sector (relative to 
GDP) rose marginally during the same period, 
the balance of outstanding loans dwindled to 
21 from 55 percent of GDP, following the 
transfer of nonperforming loans to IBRA. The 
ratio of lending to total assets also declined 
significantly, while claims on the central 
government, or government bonds injected by 
the government into the banking sector, 
increased to around 40 percent of total assets. 
As a result of a public capital injection 
(recapitalization) worth 658 trillion rupiahs 
(52 percent of GDP in 2000), the ratio of 
capital to total assets turned positive by 2000. 
The nonperforming loan ratio declined to a 
normal level by 2002. The banking sector 
climbed out of its critical state thanks to the 
emergency treatment, but the pace of the 
recovery of financial intermediation has been 
slow since 2002 in terms of lending activity, 
due in part to more stringent risk management 
by banks after the reform. The banking sector 
remained healthier than pre-financial crisis, 
1998–1999.  
After several years holding recapped 
banks, the government decided to sell the 
shares of those banks because of the necessary 
condition in order to fulfill the income budgets 
(InfoBank, 2006:15). The first divestment is 
the divesture of Bank Central Asia (BCA) on 
March 14, 2002. The government divested 51 
percent of BCA shares to Farallon Capital, 
under Farindo Investment (Mauritus) Ltd qq, 
Singapore. At the same year, Bank Niaga got 
divested by Bumiputera-Commerce Holdings 
Berhad, Malay. Then by the following years 
several banks became divested, such as Bank 
Danamon, Bank Internasional Indonesia, Bank 
NISP, Bank Permata, etc (Table 2). Since 
several largest banks in Indonesia were 
divested, a significant changed happen to the 
banking sector. 
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Table 1. Main Indicators for the Banking Sector around the Economic Crisis, 1996–2003 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
(%)         
Total assets 
 (ratio to nominal GDP) 72.8 84.3 79.8 71.8 77.8 70.9 65.8 63.9 
Total loans 
(ratio to nominal GDP) 55 60.2 51 20.5 21.3 21 22.7 26.6 
Loan to deposit ratio 104 105.7 85 36 37.3 38 43.2 54.3 
Loan to total assets 75.6 71.5 63.9 28.5 27.3 29.6 34.5 41.6 
Net interest income n.a n.a -61.2 -3.6 22.8 37.8 42.9 46.3 
Capital adequacy ratio n.a n.a -15.7 -8.1 2.5 20.5 22.5 20.7 
Nonperforming loan ratio (gross) 9.3 19.8 58.7 32.8 18.8 12.1 8.3 8.1 
Nonperforming loan ratio (nett) n.a n.a 34.7 7.3 5.8 3.6 2.9 1.8 
Number of commercial banks 239 222 208 164 151 145 142 138 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Statistik Perbankan Indonesia, 2000–2004.  
  
Table 2. The History of Divestment Process of Indonesian Banks, 1993–2005 
Period Notes 
March 14, 2002 The first divestment, the government divested 51 percent of BCA shares to Farallon 
Capital, under Farindo Investment (Mauritus) Ltd qq. 
November, 2002 The Bank Niaga divestment of 61 percent shares to Commerce Asset Holding Bhd.  
Mei 5, 2003 IBRA decided the Asia Finance Indonesia (AFI) dan Deutsche Bank as the new 
majority shareholder of Bank Danamon as much share as 51 percent of all shares. In a 
month, AFI increased the shares from 51 to 62 percent.  
November 2003 The Bank Internasional Indonesia divestment of 51 percent shares to Sorak Financial 
Holding Pte, Ltd.  
Februari 24, 2004 The Bank Lippo divestment to Santubong Investments B.V. 
April, 2004 The divestment of Bank NISP to OCBC Overseas Investments, Pte., Ltd, as much 
share as 22,5 percent.  
May 17, 2004 The divestment of 57,91 percent shares of Bank Bumiputera to ICB Financial 
Holdings.  
October, 2004 The divestment of Bank Permata to Standart Chartered Plc and PT Astra International 
Tbk.  
February 14, 2005 The OCBC Overseas Investments increased the share their held from 22,5 to 51 
percent and they became the majority owner of the bank.  
June 2, 2005 OCBC Overseas Investments made another increasing in the ownership shares in 
bank NISP, from 51 to 70,62 percent.  
Agust, 2005 The Bank Lippo acquisitioned by Khazanah Nasional Bhd. Of lippo’s 52,05 percent 
shares.  
October 14, 2005 The UOB International Investments Private became the majority owner of Bank 
Buana with 53 percent shares.  
Source: compiled from each bank annual report.  
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As in Sato (2005), comparing the situation 
before the crisis to that after bank 
restructuring, the weight of private and state 
banks was reversed (Table 3). State banks fell 
in number from seven to five, but their 
composition ratio in terms of assets rose from 
36 percent in 1996 to 50 percent in 2000. On 
the other hand, the number of private banks 
was halved, as 67 banks accounting for 16 
percent of assets (as of 1996) closed, and their 
asset composition declined from 52 to 35 
percent in the same period. Some were subject 
to reconstruction and temporarily became 
government-owned banks, accounting for 27 
percent of total assets (or 78 percent of private 
bank assets). As the government’s shares in 
those banks were latter sold off, in all cases to 
consortiums of foreign investors, foreign-
owned private banks emerged as a new cate-
gory, accounting for 21 percent of total bank 
assets in 2002. Combined with foreign bank 
branches and foreign-joint banks, the compo-
sition of foreign-affiliated banks reached 31 
percent of bank assets as a whole, up 
substantially from 9 percent before the crisis. 
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN BANKS IN 
INDONESIA 
Since the enactment of the 1998 Banking 
Act, the maximum limit of foreign ownership 
in domestic banks was raised from 51 percent 
to 99 percent. Although in addition to the 
banking act, foreign banks has been allowed to 
open branches in any location throughout 
Indonesia for ten cities maximum, it is more 
attractive for foreign parties to acquire shares 
in existing domestic banks than to establish 
new branches. This preference is an evident as 
indicated by the recent increasing number of 
banks coming under ownership of foreign 
parties as the controlling shareholders. 
Liberalization has boosted the role of foreign 
banks in Indonesia (Goeltom, 2005).  
Compare to other Asian countries, 
Indonesia was one of the most liberalized 
country in opening the banking sector to 
foreign investors. Even in Thailand, foreign 
ownership restriction was limited until 
maximum 49 percent. That policy was added 
several other rules that should must be 
followed by foreign investors such as the 
forbidden neither not to sale back the shares 
nor increased the shares (Coppel and Davis, 
2003). Meanwhile in Malaysia, foreign owner-
ship restriction was limited until maximum 30 
percent and 51 percent in Philippine. Besides 
Indonesia, the most liberalized country in 
opening the banking sector for foreign 
investors is South Korea (Table 4). 
Since the enactment of the 1999 Banking 
Act2, the structure of the banking sector 
changed significantly, especially in banking 
assets share. Before banking divestment, 1997, 
government banks took control over 45.38 
percent of banking total assets shares, and 
only 10.76 percent banking assets shares taken 
control by foreign and joint venture banks. 
Until many banks have been divested, banking 
assets shares taken control by foreign and joint 
venture banks changed significantly to 43 
percent in 2006 and the rest was taken 
controlled by national private and govern-
ment’s banks (InfoBank, 2005: 15–16).  
Foreign openness in banking sector have 
several impact to the banking sector itself and 
the economy in general. First, as the aim of 
bank restructuring, foreign investor was hoped 
to be the catalyst in reforming the financial 
industries by foreign direct investment. 
Second of all, the entry of foreign investor in 
several largest banks could force in increasing 
the competition in financial market especially 
banking sector, so it might force the banks to 
increase their efficiency. The third, it is hoped 
that it could expand new innovations in 
financial instruments, such as risk manage-
ment, information technology, corporate 
banking, and wealth management, which 
might be useful to develop the banking 
industries.  
                                                          
2 Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 29 Tahun 1999 [Govern-
ment Regulation Number 29, 1999] 
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Table 4. Limitations on Foreign Bank Commercial Presence in East Asian Economies 
Country Ownership restriction Management and Operational restriction 
Indonesia None listed for new licenses. For 
existing Banks, foreign owned equity 
is limited to 49 per cent. Local 
incorporation is required 
 
 
Higher paid up capital is required for foreign service 
suppliers than for domestic service suppliers. Branch 
offices allowed only in 10 cities. Managers or 
technical experts granted 3 year extendable visas, but 
require 2. Equivalent Indonesian staff for each 
foreigner. 
Malaysia In 1998 most restrictions were remo-
ved to increase commercial presence. 
Currently, only representative offices 
or branches of foreign banks are 
permitted. Branches may only be 
opened one year after the establish-
ment of a representative office. 
Restrictions on foreign currency loans and deposits 
and foreign exchange services. No restrictions on 
expatriate staff. Korean banks can recruit foreign 
Nationals as directors since May 1998. 
 
 
Korea Foreign shareholdings in existing 
local commercial banks are not to 
exceed 30 per cent. The 13 wholly 
foreign owned banks are permitted to 
remain. No new licenses are allowed. 
 
An institution owned or controlled by a foreign 
government is not allowed to control a commercial 
or merchant bank. Expatriate staff are not granted 
visas except for temporary presence of senior staff 
and specialists. 
Thailand No restrictions for existing foreign 
bank branches. Foreign shareholdings 
in commercial banks are not to exceed 
49 per cent. Limitations on individual 
ownership. 
Managerial, executive and specialist staff granted 
visa for a 1 year period, which is extendable for no 
more than 3 years. Existing banks with a branch 
before 1995 limited to 2 new branches. 
Philippines  Local incorporation required. Foreign 
shareholding Or acquisition in a new 
investment limited to 51. per cent. 
The foreign share of total assets is 
limited to a maximum of 30 per cent. 
10 new branches allowed between 1995 and 2000, 
with a limit of 6 from a single bank. 
 
Sources:  Based on Mattoo (2003), Kim (2002) and Hardin and Holmes (1997) in Coppel, J. and Davies, M. 
2003. Foreign Participation in East Asia’s Banking Sector. International Department Reserve 
Bank of Australia.  
 
 Table 5. Main Indicators for The Banking Sector Post Bank Divestment, 2001–2006 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Deposits (trillion rupiah)  797 836 889 963 1128 1287 
Total loans (trillion rupiah) 316 371 440 559 696 792 
Loan to deposit ratio (%) 33.01 38.24 43.52 49.95 59.66 61.56 
Capital adequacy ratio (%) 19.93 22.44 19.43 19.42 19.30 21.20 
Net interest margin (%) 3.60 4.14 4.64 5.88 5.63 5.77 
Nonperforming loan ratio gross (%) 12.23 7.50 6.78 4.50 7.56 6.07 
Cost to operating income (%) 98.41 94.76 88.10 76.64 89.50 97.65 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Statistik Perbankan Indonesia, 2003–2007.  
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Meanwhile, not only the ownership that 
changed into foreign, but also many banks 
changed a part of the management into 
foreigners. In several cases, the owner decided 
to change the head of management or the chief 
executive officer (CEO) so that they would 
represent their importance of the bank 
controlling. 
Several years after bank restructuring 
showed a significant improvement in the 
banking sector. It is shown by the improving 
fundamental banking indicators, such as total 
deposits, total loans, loan to deposit ratio, 
capital adequacy ratio, net interest margin, 
nonperforming loan ratio, and cost to 
operating income ratio (Table 5). It becomes 
interesting to examine whether there is a 
significant relationship between ownership 
structure and bank performance. Does these 
improvement related to the ownership 
structure changing of the banks? Does the 
foreign CEO influence the bank performance 
significantly in order to improve it?  
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BANK 
PERFORMANCE 
Evidence across many countries indicates 
that foreign banks are on average less efficient 
than domestic bank (DeYoung & Nolle, 1996; 
Hasan & Hunter, 1996; Mahajan et.al, 1996; 
Chang et. al, 1998 in Kobeissi, 2004). Studies 
that have not used the U.S. as the host nation 
in the analysis, have found that foreign banks 
have almost the same average efficiency as 
domestic banks (Vander, 1996; Hasan & 
Lozano-Vivas, 1998 in Kobeissi, 2004). 
Claessens et al. (2002) reported that in many 
developing countries (for example Egypt, 
Indonesia, Argentina and Venezuela) foreign 
banks in fact report significantly higher net 
interest margins than domestic banks and in 
Asia and in Latin America foreign banks 
achieve significantly higher net profitability 
than domestic banks. 
Several studies examined that there are 
significant relationships between ownership 
structure and bank performance especially in 
developing countries (Aydin, et al., 2007; 
Kobeissi, 2004; Laeven, 2005; Micco, et al., 
2004). Kobeissi’s research (2004) found that 
in Afrika, private banks moreover foreign 
banks performed significantly better that any 
other group of sample banks. Meanwhile, 
Laeven’s research (2005) found that foreign 
banks in East Asia also had a significant better 
performance than domestic banks. 
Both Sarkar et.al. (1998) and De (2003) 
studied about ownership structure and bank 
performance in India with a different period of 
samples. With the same indicators of 
performance, those studies proved that there 
are no significant relationships between 
ownership structure and bank performance.  
Even the central bank of Indonesia, Bank 
Indonesia, had made a research on the 
relationship between ownership structure and 
bank performance in Indonesia. Using only a 
cross-section data with only one period of 
time, December 2002, this study use the 
statistical test to examine whether there is a 
relationship or not. It defined ownership 
structure into several criteria, neither there are: 
corporation nor individual, listed nor unlisted 
banks, government’s nor private, and neither 
foreign owned nor domestic owned based on 
the ownership concentration. This study con-
cluded that there is no relationship between 
ownership structure and bank performance, 
but in some case there could be a little relation 
between them (Hadad, et al., 2003).  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Performance Measurements 
Measures of bank performance can 
broadly be broken down in two categories: 
those based on accounting information and 
those based on market information. Most 
recent researches used accounting information 
approach in measuring bank performance 
(Aydin, et.al., 2007; Claessens, et.al., 2000; 
Micco, et.al., 2004; De, 2003; Sarkar, et.al., 
1998). The most common use of accounting-
 Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia Oktober 
 
358
based measurements of bank performance 
indicators are return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), and operating profit ratio 
(OPR), reflecting the profitability of the 
banks. Some of them used the efficiency ratio 
such as net interest margin (NIM), operating 
cost ratio, and X-efficiency. Both profitability 
and efficiency ratios are to show that a highly 
profitable bank must have a better financial 
stability; therefore, the bank performs better 
(Laeven, 2005).  
Meanwhile, some researches reconsidered 
using accounting based measures as the bank 
performance indicators (Beck, 1986; Horvath, 
2005; Miranti, 1990; Verbeeten, 2005; Wet, 
2005). Horvarth (2005) doubted the accuracy 
and ability of accounting-based measurements 
to show the real existing condition of the 
bank, moreover to use it as the basic 
evaluation in measuring the real value of a 
company. Accounting information approach is 
inclined to measure performance based on 
earnings, whereas there are other factors that 
should be considered in measuring bank 
performance (Horvath, 2005). Furthermore, 
accounting information only reflects a 
temporary condition and it could not reflects 
the continuity of existing competitiveness 
between banks in long terms. In fact, market 
measures performance based on what already 
happened in the past and what market expects 
to happen in the future. According to efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH)3, financial market 
has the most symmetric information of all 
markets. Consequently, whenever new 
information appears market responses based 
on rational expectations. Indeed, market based 
                                                          
3  In finance, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
asserts that financial markets are "informationally 
efficient", or that price on traded assets, e.g., stocks, 
bonds, or property, already reflect all known infor-
mation and therefore are unbiased in the sense that they 
reflect the collective beliefs of all investors about 
future prospects. The efficient market hypothesis was 
first expressed by Louis Bachelier, a French 
mathematician, in his 1900 dissertation, "The Theory 
of Speculation" that developed by Eugene Fama (1965) 
in "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices". Journal of 
Business 38: 34–105.  
approach might be a better alternative in 
performance measuring, because it could 
capture the whole performance of a company. 
There are various indicators to be used in 
measuring performance by market-based 
approach. Beck (1986) used share price as a 
performance indicator of a company. Share 
price is a resultant of all factors measuring 
performance, such as profitability, efficiency, 
management performance, and any external 
factors that not shown in accounting-based 
measures only. Furthermore, share price 
reflects not only the potential value of a 
company, but also company’s ability to handle 
risk in long and short-terms.  
This paper use both accounting and 
market-based approach to measure bank 
performance. Profitability measures are used 
to evaluate bank performance and take the 
return associated with bank’s portfolio into 
account. The two profitability measures used 
in our analysis are return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE). ROA is defined as the 
net profits of the banks divided by the average 
bank assets. Thus, this measure summarizes 
the ability of the management to produce net 
earnings from bank assets. Meanwhile, ROE is 
defined as the net profits of the banks divided 
by bank’s total equity. this measure summa-
rizes corporation's profitability that reveals 
how much profit a company generates with 
the money shareholders have invested. ROE is 
useful for comparing the profitability of a 
company to that of other firms in the same 
industry.  
For market-based approach in the analy-
sis, this paper uses the market capitalization 
into account. Market capitalization (market 
cap or capitalized value) is a measurement of 
corporate or economic size equal to the share 
price times the number of shares outstanding 
of a public company. As owning stock 
represents owning the company, including all 
its assets, capitalization could represent the 
public opinion of a company's net worth and is 
a determining factor in stock valuation. 
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Likewise, the capitalization of stock markets 
or economic regions may be compared to 
other economic indicators. This paper use the 
deflator of market cap as an indicator of 
market-based measures in order to reduce the 
possibility of different outstanding stock as an 
effect of stock split4 between banks.  
The Empirical Model Specification 
The model that is used in this paper in 
testing for the presence of foreign ownership 
effects on bank performance is the following: 
PERFORMANCEit =  
itit
itit
CONTROL
DCEOFOREIGN




3
210  
where Performanceit and other variables cap-
ture the banks and time specific effects; i 
denotes bank, and t denotes time quarterly 
each year.  
 The dependent variables that had been 
outlined in previous section as the bank 
performance indicators are return on asset 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and market 
capitalization deflator (Marketcapdef). Those 
indicators are represented the accounting and 
market based measures from profitability and 
market perspectives.  
There are two dummy variables in order 
to describe foreign ownership and foreign 
head management’s effect to bank perfor-
mance. The dummy variable that indicates 
foreign ownership feature is FOREIGN. The 
dummy FOREIGN takes a value one if the 
bank in question is foreign owned bank and 
zero elsewhere or domestic owned bank. The 
definition of ownership is defined by the 
                                                          
4  Stock split is a decision made by company’s board of 
directors to increase the number of shares that are 
outstanding by issuing more shares to current share-
holders. For example, in a 2-for-1 stock split, every 
shareholder with one stock is given an additional stock. 
The price is adjusted such that the before and after 
market capitalization of the company remains the same 
and dilution does not occur.   
majority ownership of a bank, which could be 
foreign owners or domestic owners. This 
paper does not separate between domestic 
privates and government ownership. Both are 
mentioned as domestic owned banks.  
The other dummy variable is used in order 
to describe head management’s effect on bank 
performance. The dummy variable that 
indicates whether the head management or the 
chief executive officer is foreigners or 
domestic civilest is CEO. The dummy CEO 
takes a value one if the chief executive officer 
of the bank is foreigners and zero if otherwise.  
The control variable includes the set of 
variables other than ownership and head 
management presence that might affect the 
performance of banks. The set of independent 
variables are logarithm of total assets 
(LOGASET), loan to deposit ratio (LDR), net 
interest margin (NIM), capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR), and the economic growth 
(ECGROWTH). LOGASET is introduced into 
the regression in order to account any scale 
effects in bank operations. Meanwhile, LDR 
and NIM are included to control for 
differences in the bank performance that may 
arise due to the ability of bank in functioning 
as financial intermediaries and taking profit 
from collecting and distributing fund. Then, 
CAR is included to control for differences in 
the bank performance that may arise due to the 
bank capital sufficiency. The last control 
variable is included as a macro economic 
indicator that might affect bank performance. 
The variable is economic growth 
(ECGROWTH).  
Data 
The following empirical model is 
estimated for each performance indicator by 
pooled data in quarter sample period starts in 
first quarter of 2004 until the third quarter of 
2007. Two years in average after massive 
banking devastation in 2002 seems to be the 
best starting time to see the affect of changing 
ownership of Indonesian banking structure. 
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Using 12 commercial listed banks that cover 
about 70 percent of total Indonesian-banking 
assets, this paper uses 143 unbalanced panel 
data observations. The 12 commercial listed 
banks are PT Bank Mandiri Tbk, PT Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia Tbk, PT Bank Negara 
Indonesia Tbk, PT Bank Central Asia Tbk, PT 
Bank Niaga Tbk, PT Bank Internasional 
Indonesia Tbk, PT Bank Lippo Tbk, PT Bank 
UOB Buana Tbk, PT Bank NISP Tbk, PT 
Bank Permata, PT Bank Panin Tbk, and PT 
Bank Mega Tbk.  
The accounting data are obtained from 
various financial consolidation reports publi-
shed by each bank quarterly and it is calcu-
lated from the balance sheet, consolidated of 
incomes, and notes to consolidated financial 
statements. The accounting based measures 
for performance indicators and several control 
variables have been calculated base on Bank 
Indonesia regulatory for financial statement 
reports and bank financial ratios5. The banks 
annual and quarterly reports are downloaded 
from Indonesia Stock Exchange, http:// 
www.idx.co.id.  
Meanwhile, the market data used in this 
paper is market capitalization, which is the 
multiplied between share price and the number 
of shares issued and paid fully. In estimating 
the bank performance using market-based 
measures, the using share price is the average 
of daily share price in a month after the end of 
quarter period. It is assumed that this period is 
the time market responded to the bank 
performance. The historical share price data 
and the number of shares issued information is 
downloaded from http://finance.yahoo.com.  
                                                          
5  Surat Edaran Bank Indonesia Nomor 7/56/DPBS 
Desember 9, 2005, perihal Laporan Keuangan Publikasi 
Triwulanan dan Bulanan Bank Umum serta Laporan 
tertentu yang disampaikan kepada Bank Indonesia 
[Bank Indonesia’s Publicity Letter 7/56/DPBS Desem-
ber 9, 2005, about Quarter and Monthly Annual Report 
and some Special Report to be submitted to bank 
Indonesia]. 
 
Estimation Procedure 
In estimating panel data, there are several 
possible methods, two most popular methods 
are fixed effects model (FEM) and random 
effects model or error correction model 
(ECM). The reason for choosing FEM over 
ECM is primarily driven by data and 
sometimes the significances over the variables 
in explaining the aim of the research. 
Gudjarati (2003: 650–651) explained that this 
choosing between FEM and ECM is depends 
on the correlations between the error 
components and the regressors. If it is 
assumed that the error components and the 
regressors are uncorrelated, so ECM might be 
appropriate, whereas if the error components 
and the regressors are correlated, FEM might 
be appropriate. Taken from Judge (1980: 489–
491), Gudjarati (2003) also explained that it 
could use the information of the number of 
time series data and cross-sectional units to 
decide whether to use FEM or ECM. If the 
number of time series data is larger than the 
number of cross-sectional units, there is likely 
to be a little difference in the values of the 
parameters estimated by FEM and ECM. 
Hence, the choice here is based on 
computational convenience. On this case, 
FEM might preferable. 
The model will be estimated using the 
technique of Generalized Least Square (GLS). 
This method of panel regression will take care 
of the endogen problem to a certain extent. 
Besides that, since the regression technique 
uses data for several time-periods, any past 
period performance affecting future 
ownership, if at all any such effect is present, 
will be taken care of and thus, the problem 
will be reduced (De, 2003). As in Gudjarati 
(2003: 395–397), GLS method is able to turn 
the variance of the transformed disturbance 
term into homoscedastic. So that the model 
could fulfill the least square standard, which 
had a best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE). 
Using GLS, EVIEWS program could help to 
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reduce the autocorrelation problems by doing 
iteration.  
THE ESTIMATION RESULT  
Table 6 and 7 provide descriptive 
statistics of all relevant variables by each bank 
and by ownership structure. From table 6, it 
can be said that in the sample period of time 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BBRI) had the best 
performance between sample banks. Based on 
profitability, BBRI had the highest return on 
assets (ROA)—5.04 percent and a high return 
on equity (ROE)—37.38 percent. In addition, 
based on market performance using market 
capitalization deflator, it can be inferred from 
the table that BBRI also had a high growth in 
market capitalization since the beginning of 
year 2004 (Table 6). 
  
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics by Bank Cross-sections 
Name of 
banks used in 
the sample 
Return on 
Assets 
Return on 
Equity 
Market 
Capitalization 
Deflator 
Loan to 
Deposit Ratio
Net Interest 
Margin 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Ratio 
BBCA 3.40% 27.47% 270.87 35.38% 6.27% 23.54% 
  (0.002) (0.014) (35.08) (0.057)  (0.014) 
BMRI 2.03% 14.75% 219.36 53.10% 4.96% 24.73% 
  (0.012) (0.091) (58.086) (0.036) (0.007) (0.013) 
BBNI 1.93% 20.74% 185.82 51.49% 6.57% 16.73% 
  (0.005) (0.061) (50.106) (0.036) (0.016) (0.016) 
BBRI 5.04% 37.38% 312.16 74.82% 11.88% 18.48% 
  (0.007) (0.061) (47.155) (0.039) (0.012) (0.023) 
BBIA 3.29% 18.73% 201.58 73.22% 8.78% 27.48% 
  (0.004) (0.030) (18.713) (0.157) (0.029) (0.050) 
BNLI 1.71% 17.69% 90.12 85.59% 8.56% 11.58% 
  (0.005) (0.088) (10.946) (0.307) (0.030) (0.020) 
MEGA 2.24% 52.62% 342.84 48.80% 9.89% 15.13% 
  (0.011) (0.960) (90.962) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027) 
NISP 1.77% 15.13% 201.20 80.32% 6.43% 17.34% 
  (0.005) (0.064) (21.497) (0.055) (0.003) (0.021) 
PNBN 3.28% 15.04% 241.81 123.17% 11.53% 27.33% 
  (0.010) (0.032) (70.675) (0.388) (0.026) (0.061) 
BNGA 2.66% 22.93% 412.60 87.71% 3.69% 17.57% 
  (0.005) (0.060) (93.257) (0.063) (0.018) (0.006) 
LPBN 2.18% 19.60% 286.42 53.35% 9.39% 21.19% 
  (0.008) (0.093) (68.288) (0.826) (0.022) (0.035) 
BNII 2.33% 16.76% 135.73 55.68% 7.55% 23.44% 
  (0.010) (0.049) (34.538) (0.088) (0.012) (0.016) 
Note. 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
  2. All numbers are in percentages except for market capitalization deflator and assets.  
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics by Ownership Structure 
  Foreign Domestic All 
Explained variables    
Return on assets (ROA) 2.32 2.58 2.39 
 (0.33) (0.43) (0.35) 
return on equity (ROE) 19.87 23.06 20.67 
 (3.12) (6.07) (3.86) 
Market Capitalization Deflator (MARKETCAPDEF) 241.13 224.17 236.89 
 (58.21) (67.83) (60.62) 
Explanatory variables    
Loan to deposit ratio (LDR) 77.28 60.39 73.06 
 (11.13) (2.68) (9.02) 
Net interest margin (NIM) 8.61 7.58 8.35 
 (1.06) (1.94) (1.28) 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 20.39 19.63 20.20 
 (2.46) (1.65) (2.26) 
 Economic growth (ECGROWTH) 5.59 5.59 5.59 
Note.  1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
2. All numbers are in percentages except for market capitalization deflator and assets.  
 
Meanwhile, when the sample divided 
based on ownership structure, it is shown at 
table 7 that the average return on assets (ROA) 
of foreign bank was 2.32 percent and for 
domestic bank was 2.58 percent. Beside that, 
the average return on equity (ROE) of foreign 
banks was 19.87 percent and for domestic 
bank was 23.06 percent. It means that based 
on accounting measurements domestic bank 
performance was better than foreign banks. 
However, the standard deviation of both ROA 
and ROE of domestic banks is higher than 
foreign bank’s. It suggested that they should 
be heterogenic in terms of their profitability 
performance compared with both foreign and 
domestic bank. 
In terms of market approach, foreign bank 
seemed to have a higher growth than domestic 
bank. Foreign bank average market 
capitalization deflator was 241.13 and for 
domestic bank were 224.17. It can be inferred 
that in mean foreign bank had a better 
performance than domestic bank. Meanwhile, 
the standard deviation of foreign bank was 
lower than domestic ones, suggesting that they 
were more homogenous in terms of market 
performance. For the explanatory variables, 
foreign bank tended to have a higher loan to 
deposit ratio, net interest margin, and capital 
adequacy ratio, and the standard deviation of 
loan to deposit ratio and capital adequacy ratio 
remained larger than domestic bank.  
The set of regressions that have been 
described appear to provide a qualified 
support to the descriptive evidence discussed 
in the first part of the paper. Although it is 
evident that our results should not be 
generalized to countries with different 
financial and regulatory structures, they detect 
behaviors often obscured by the higher noise 
that plagues data of multi-country panels. The 
estimation followed two methods of panel data 
regression, which are Generalized Least 
Square fixed effects model, and Generalized 
Least Square random effects model. After 
comparing some indicators such as adjusted 
least square, F-test, sum square residuals, and 
other indicators, this paper used Generalized 
Least Square fixed effects model in estimating 
the model. 
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Table 8. Regression Result Generalized Least Square Fixed Effect Model 
Explained variables 
Explanatory  
variables  
(1) 
Return on Asset  
(ROA) 
(2) 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
(3) 
Market Capitalization 
Deflator 
LOGASET 
 
-0.001** 
(-2.19 ) 
0.006*** 
(3.56) 
1.40 
(0.93) 
LDR 
 
0.001 
(0.73) 
–0.034*** 
(-2.86) 
13.30 
(0.73) 
NIM 
 
0.117*** 
(6.03) 
0.371*** 
(3.34) 
-470.70*** 
(-2.86) 
CAR 
 
0.005 
(0.79) 
0.069 
(1.40) 
311.77*** 
(4.14) 
ECGROWTH 
 
0.181*** 
(5.24) 
0.99*** 
(3.10) 
3556.81*** 
(12.78) 
FOREIGN 
 
–0.006*** 
(-3.83) 
–0.097*** 
(-5.50) 
24.61*** 
(6.66) 
CEO 
 
–0.004*** 
(-4.21) 
–0.051*** 
(-6.61) 
26.73 
(2.49) 
Observation 151 151 143 
Adj. R-squared 0.92 0.90 0.90 
Note.    t-statistics in parentheses. 
 *** value significant at 1% level. 
 **   value significant at 5 % level.  
Each regression equation is estimated by using the generalized least square fixed effect model.  
 
Referred to the results of the estimation in 
table 8 column 1 and 2, the coefficient of 
FOREIGN dummy is negative and significant 
at 1 percent significance level in ROA and 
ROE regressions. These results indicated that 
foreign banks are significantly less profitable 
than domestic banks after controlling for 
several structural differences. On average, 
foreign banks have ROA that is 0.6 percent 
lesser than domestic banks and ROE, which is 
9.7 lesser than domestic banks. However, as 
had discussed before, the standard deviation 
between groups was high (table 7). So that, the 
groups of either foreign or domestic banks do 
not reflects banks individually. It might 
happen because there are few of domestic 
banks whose ROA remained a lot higher than 
the average performance between samples 
(table 6), such as Bank BRI (BBRI) and Bank 
Panin (PNBN). The estimation of ROE also 
has been followed by a high standard devia-
tion between samples. There are few of 
domestic banks whose ROE remained a lot 
higher than the average performance between 
samples, such as Bank BRI (BBRI) and Bank 
Mega (MEGA). So that, the groups was 
limped in order to be concluded that all 
domestic banks had a better performance.  
Based on market approach, it is inferred 
from the estimation that referred to the results 
of the estimation in table 8 column 1 and 2, 
the coefficient of FOREIGN dummy is 
positive and significant at 1 percent signifi-
cance level in market capitalization deflator 
regression. This result indicated that foreign 
banks are significantly performed better than 
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domestic banks, in this case with a lower 
standard deviation between samples (table 7). 
It can be inferred from the means of sample 
banks that many foreign banks had a higher 
growth (indicated from the market capitali-
zation deflator) than any banks in the sample, 
even though two of domestic banks had an 
above average market capitalization deflator, 
Bank BRI (BBRI) and Bank Panin (PNBN). 
This might happen because possibly there 
should be a difference between fundamental 
indicators of accounting-based and market-
based performance, which made the conclu-
sion, went into a different way. It might arise 
from the different market strategy between 
groups of ownership structure. The domestic 
banks tend to have a wider infrastructure in 
banking channeling, so they tend to have 
larger market shares, which might influence a 
higher return. At the same time, in the mid 
sample period of time few of the domestic 
banks—Bank mandiri (BMRI) and Bank 
Negara Indonesia (BBNI)— have had a 
serious problem in controlling nonperforming 
loans. In this case, it might influence the 
domestic banks performance in financial 
market.  
Meanwhile, in line with the FOREIGN 
dummy, the results of the estimation also 
indicated that the coefficient of CEO dummy 
is negatively significant at 1 percent signifi-
cance level in ROA and ROE regressions, and 
positively significant at 1 percent significance 
level in the regression of market capitalization 
deflator (table 8 columns 1, 2, and 3). Those 
estimations indicated that a bank with foreign 
CEO is less profitable than banks with 
domestic CEO. Beside that, they did not 
perform better than banks with domestic CEO 
leadings. Therefore, it can be inferred from the 
estimations that domestic CEO might have a 
better management and strategy facing the 
domestic market in compare to foreign CEO.  
As in table 8 columns 1, 2, and 3, among 
the control variables, logarithm of total assets 
(LOGASET) had a negative significant effect 
in the ROA regression, while it had a positive 
significant effect in the ROE regression. This 
condition might arise when the assets of the 
banks went into an expansion and the equity 
remained steady or the increase is much 
slower than the growth of bank assets. Then, 
the ROE could increase when the ROA get 
lower. Meanwhile, LOGASET did not have 
any significant effect to market capitalization 
growth.  
Meanwhile, loan to deposit ratio (LDR) 
tended not to have any significant effect on 
ROA and the regression of market capitaliza-
tion deflator, but there is a negative significant 
effect between LDR and the ROE. This might 
be a robust indication, because it is in contrast 
with the expectation that it has been hoped the 
increasing LDR in terms of the increasing of 
bank role in fund intermediaries would 
increase the bank earnings. Then, net interest 
margin (NIM) tended to have a positive 
significant effect in bank profitability. Higher 
NIM would increase the bank’s earnings. 
However, there is a negative significant effect 
in the regression of market capitalization 
deflator. It can be inferred that the decreasing 
NIM should not indicate that the lower 
earnings would preserve. Higher the NIM is 
one of the bank strategies in order to increase 
the bank’s earnings. However, lowering the 
NIM might increase the earnings if the bank 
succeeded in expanding the volume of 
transactions. Beside that, the average NIM in 
Indonesia is still above world’s average on 
NIM, so in the following years the NIM tend 
to decrease. Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) had 
no significant effect to bank profitability, but 
it had a positive significant effect to the 
regression of market capitalization deflator. It 
is indicated the bank sufficiency in capital, in 
terms of bank ability in backing up the credit 
and market risk, influenced the market 
trustiness of the bank.  
The last control variable is economic 
growth (ECGROWTH), which represented the 
external factor might influenced bank 
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performance. Referred to all of the 
regressions, ECGROWTH had a positive 
significant effect in bank performance. It is 
indicated that the macro economic condition is 
a significant factors in bank performance. It 
might be the main indicators that would 
influence the performance of the bank as a 
whole.  
CONCLUSION 
Enormous banking crisis has made a big 
hit in the economy. Started from the currency 
turmoil, the unsound and ill-regulated banks 
have turned the currency turmoil into a 
banking crisis, until the contagious effect 
spread into financial crisis and finally the 
economic crisis. Because of the importance of 
banking sector to the economy, the govern-
ment and the central bank have made several 
restructuring program in order to cure the 
banking illness, such as bank recapitalization. 
After the recapping program was over, the 
government and the central bank decided to 
divesture the shares of several banks. Since 
the banking divestment, a significant changed 
in banking structure especially ownership 
structure, occurred. Not only the changed 
ownership structures, but also several banks 
decided to change the head of management or 
the chief executive officer to represent the 
owner’s importance to the bank. Since the 
bank restructured and being devastated, many 
improvements happened in several fundamen-
tals banking indicators.  
This paper has examined the relationship 
between ownership structures to bank 
performance of Indonesian listed banks. The 
performance indicators are return on asset 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and market 
capitalization deflator, in order to represent 
the accounting-based measures and market-
based measures. The results of the regression 
analysis have shown that with respect to 
profitability indicators, there are positive 
significant foreign ownership structure effects. 
It is indicated that foreign banks are 
significantly less profitable than domestic 
banks after controlling for several structural 
differences. Meanwhile, in respect to market 
based approach, there are a negative signi-
ficant foreign ownership structure effect. It is 
indicated that foreign banks are significantly 
performed better than domestic banks. The 
ownership structure and bank performance 
relationship was in contrast with other studies 
in several developing countries (Aydin, et al., 
2007; Kobeissi, 2004; Laeven, 2005; Micco, 
et al., 2004).  
In addition to the study, this paper 
examined the relationship between bank with 
foreign CEO and domestic ones. The results of 
the regression analysis have shown that 
foreign CEO dummy is negatively significant 
to bank performance. It is indicated that a 
bank with foreign CEO is less profitable than 
banks with domestic CEO. Beside that, banks 
with foreign CEO did not perform better than 
banks with domestic CEO leadings.  
From this paper it could conclude that 
even after the banking divestment, the foreign 
banks did not prove to have a better 
performance than domestic banks. Moreover, 
domestic banks perform better than foreign 
banks significantly, in terms of profitability. 
Beside that, a foreign CEO ought not to 
influence better than domestic CEO.  
Perhaps it could be the best time to 
consider whether the banking openness is 
necessary in the next long term, before this 
country runs out of domestic banks in the 
middle of the rapid development in banking 
sectors. But this is not the main purpose of this 
paper, because there are several obstacles in 
restricting the ownership limitation. However, 
not only in limitations of banking sector that 
should be the concern of banking issues, but 
also the banking monitoring should be 
improved and the competition among banks 
would be the next considering issues. Beside 
that, the government should force the 
economic growth to remain stable, because of 
the significant effect on banking performance.  
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